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Abstract
When school quality increases with the educational standard set by
schools, education before college needs not be a hierarchy with private
schools oﬀering better quality than public schools. An alternative conﬁg-
uration, with public schools oﬀering a higher educational standard than
private schools, is also possible, in spite of the fact that tuition levied
by private schools is strictly positive. In our model, private schools can
oﬀer a lower educational standard at a positive price because they attract
students with a relatively high cost of eﬀort, who would ﬁnd the high
standards of public schools excessively demanding. With the key para-
meters calibrated for the US and Italy, our model predicts that majority
voting in the US supports a system with high quality private schools and
low quality public schools, as assumed by Epple and Romano, 1998. An
equilibrium with low quality private schools is supported instead in Italy.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Do private schools always provide better service than public schools? The an-
swer is apparently straightforward: since private schools charge a positive price
(tuition), they can only attract students by providing better service than public
schools, which are funded by the taxpayer (see De Fraja, 2004). Yet quality is
not the only service that private schools can provide. In a recent scandal, Italian
prosecutors have found that some private schools in the country used to sell high
school diplomas at a price. The so called "Diploma no problem" organization
provided "good service" to its customers: answers were supplied in advance for
written and oral exams, and attendance records were ﬁxed. The national exam
for the leaving high school certiﬁcate was also by-passed by having customers
take the exams in places where the outcome was assured (The Economist, June
12th, 2004, p.31).
In this admittedly extreme example, private schools can charge a fee by
allowing customers to grab the degree with little eﬀort: the service oﬀered
is not quality but leisure. Less extreme is the evidence discussed by Bertola
and Checchi, 2002, who ﬁnd that Italian public high schools are associated on
average to better performance, followed by religious private schools and lay
private schools. They interpret this as evidence that private schools in Italy
appear to focus more on the recovery of less brilliant students than on across
the board high quality education. Italy is not an isolated case. Vandenberghe
and Robin, 2004, look at the results of standardized tests in maths, reading
and science reported in the 2000 OECD Program for International Student
Assessment survey and ﬁnd that public schools can outperform private schools
in France and Austria. De Fraja, 2004, reports evidence on the UK by Marks
and coauthors, who ﬁnd that there is considerable variation in the quality of UK
religious - and private - schools: some are very good but other are very poor1.
1He also quotes evidence by Feinstein and Symons, 1999, who ﬁnd that attendance of
private schools does not aﬀect on average individual performance in the UK. Hanushek, 2002,
argues that "..it seems natural to believe that Catholic schools also exhibit wide variation in
performance, although none of the existing analyses document either the magnitude or the
potential causes of such diﬀerences." (p.74)
2Across the Atlantic, several studies have investigated the relative eﬀective-
ness and quality of private and public schools, with mixed results. On the
one hand, Evans and Schwab, 1995, and Neal, 1997, ﬁnd evidence that private
Catholic schools increase student achievement with respect to public schools,
especially for minorities. On the other hand, Figlio and Stone, 1999, assess the
eﬀect of religious and non-religious US private schools on educational outcomes
and ﬁnd that, in general, only the former increase individual outputs relative
to public schools. In a review of this empirical literature, McEwan, 2000, con-
cludes that private Catholic secondary schools in the US have consistent eﬀects
on improving college attendance and high school graduation, but almost no
eﬀect on individual achievement in standardized tests. Broadly, this evidence
suggests that private schools are heterogeneous, with some oﬀering poorer aca-
demic quality and some others oﬀering better quality than public schools. Why
do households pay to sent their oﬀspring to school of lower academic quality?
Figlio and Stone, 1999, argue that parents who enrol their oﬀspring in private
schools may care for other outcomes, such as discipline, extracurricular activi-
ties, religious matters and the opportunity to interact with a certain peer group.
In spite of the evidence, the theoretical literature - to our knowledge - does
not entertain the possibility that private schools can be of lower academic quality
than public schools. Recent exceptions are Oliveira, 2006, and McMillan, 2004.
Oliveira studies a market with two universities, which compete for students by
setting admission standards. McMillan has a model where rent-seeking public
schools ﬁnd it optimal to reduce productivity when a voucher is introduced.
An important paper in this area is Epple and Romano, 1998, who model
the education market as a stratiﬁed hierarchy of school qualities, with private
schools doing systematically better than public schools. Schools in their model
are clubs of students who diﬀer in their academic ability, and school quality
is simply the average quality of enrolled pupils. The essential reason for the
existence of a hierarchy with public schools dominated by private institutions
is that the latter must be of higher peer quality than the former, otherwise no
3student would be willing to pay to attend a private school. In their model, state
schools act as residual repositories, taking in all those students who do not enrol
in private schools.
In this paper we question the assumptions that private schools oﬀer only
quality for a price and that public schools act as residual repositories. First,
private schools can charge a positive price for leisure, access to networks or for
religious education2. Second, the view that public schools are of the poorest
quality is both not always consistent with the stylized facts and not grounded
in a policy decision rule, be it the maximization of a social welfare function or
a political equilibrium based on majority voting.
Until recently, the literature on school quality has been dominated by the
education production function approach, w i t hi t se m p h a s i so ns c h o o lr e s o u r c e s .
This important approach has not produced yet a consensus on the importance
of resources for school quality (see Hanushek. 2002, for a review). Following
recent research, we believe that a key factor aﬀecting school quality not explored
enough by the literature is the set of incentives facing students3. Student time,
ability and eﬀort are important inputs in education, which can be aﬀected by
adequate incentives, including educational standards (Costrell, 1994). When a
school increases its standard it raises its quality for two reasons: ﬁrst, most
students respond by working harder, and learning more. Second, since the cost
of eﬀort declines with ability, higher standards attract better students.
As in Costrell, 1994, we deﬁne the educational standard as the productivity
level to graduate. The higher the level, the higher the standard. Depending on
the country, the selected standard is enforced by a combination of curriculum
choice, tests and grading standards4. In this paper, we treat educational stan-
2Cohen Zada and Justman, 2001, study the role of religion in private education.
3See for instance Betts, 1997, 1998, Brunello and Ishikawa, 1999, Figlio and Lucas, 2004,
and De Fraja and Landeras, 2006. Betts argues that ..."..the education production function,
which has dominated the school quality literature for the past 25 years, treats students and
school resources as symmetric inputs in a neoclassical production function. It thus neglects
the fact that the most important ’inputs’ - students - are better characterized as economic
agents with their own objectives.." (1997, p.2)
4John Bishop, 1995, 1997, attributes the relatively poor performance of American high
school students in international tests to the fact that US high schools tend on average not
to reward eﬀort and learning as much as Japanese and European schools do. Moreover,
4d a r d sa si n c e n t i v e sw h i c ha ﬀect the quality of public and private schools because
they promote individual eﬀort and the self-selection of students by ability.
We consider a simpliﬁed market for education with only a public and a pri-
vate school and a sequential structure. In the ﬁrst stage of the sequential game,
the government decides the educational standard of the public school, which
charges no admission fees. The decision criterion used by the government is
majority voting. We believe that this is an appealing and intuitive criterion for
the US system of primary and secondary education (see Fernandez and Roger-
son, 1995), where individuals vote on the level of education provision in their
district and on the associated local property taxation. We are aware, however,
that there are other possible decision rules, such as welfare maximization (see
De Fraja, 2002). Therefore, in the paper we also compare the outcome of ma-
jority voting with the choice by a social planner who maximizes a utilitarian
welfare function.
In the second stage, a private school enters the market and chooses both
the positive tuition fee and its own educational standard, which could be above
or below the standard set by the public school. The private school maximizes
proﬁts by taking into account that its choice of price and standard aﬀects the
demand for its services. Proﬁtm a x i m i z a t i o ni sa na s s u m p t i o nu s e di nm o s to f
this literature, see for instance Stiglitz, 1974, and Epple and Romano, 1998. By
restricting entry to a single private school, we focus on the relative quality of
public and private schools at the cost of overlooking the heterogeneity of private
schools. We feel that the treatment of this heterogeneity is important but would
require a separate paper.
An equilibrium in this economy is the combination of the public and private
school educational standards and the nonnegative tuition fee set by the private
school, which satisfy both majority voting and proﬁt maximization. We show
that there are two possible equilibria: a) the private school sets a higher ed-
assessment in the US is not measured as elsewhere against an absolute, external standard,
which makes it diﬃcult to convey valuable information on individual ability to the labour
market. Betts, 1998, argues in favour of higher educational standards as a key element in
high school reform in the US.
5ucational standard than the public school; b) the private school sets a lower
educational standard than the public school.
While case a) is consistent with Epple and Romano’s story, case b) is not
as it produces a hierarchy with private schools providing lower quality than
public schools. We estimate the key parameters of the model by using empiri-
cal evidence from the US and Italy and ﬁnd that majority voting selects "low
quality public school - high quality private school" in the former country and
"low quality private school - high quality public school" in the latter country.
Interestingly, the choice made by majority voting turns out to be the same
taken by a social planner who maximizes the welfare of all the households in
the economy. We interpret the diﬀerence in standards between public and pri-
vate schools in these two countries as two diﬀerent equilibria in our model of
educational standards.
Our results have interesting policy implications. A lot of policy debate, and
a non-negligible amount of policy practice, such as school vouchers, is based on
the assumption that private schools are better from an educational viewpoint.
If instead private schools turn out to be better because they provide some other
non-educational service, then a substantial part of policy justiﬁcation for vouch-
ers falls by the wayside.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section
3 considers both the outcome of majority voting and the one produced by a
utilitarian social planner. An application to the US and Italy is discussed in
Section 4. Conclusions follow.
2 The Model
We consider a sequential Hotelling-type model where education before college
is provided by a public and a private school. The timing of the model is as
follows: ﬁrst, the government decides the educational standard of the public
school sG ∈ [1,2]; second, a private school decides entry, tuition p and its
educational standard sP ∈ [1,2]; third, a continuum of households, with unitary
6mass, enrols their oﬀspring in one of the available schools, after observing the
educational standard of each school and the tuition price set by the private
school.
Learning the more sophisticated maths and science implied by a higher stan-
dard requires both higher eﬀort by students and adequate facilities such as labs
and libraries. Notice that higher standards are not synonymous of more school
resources: while the former require better facilities, the latter without appro-
priate incentives can fail to improve school quality5.L e tk ∈ [0,1] be the unit
cost of setting the standard, independently of whether the school is public or
private6. An increase in the standard requires higher total costs. The costs
borne by the public school, ksG, are funded by a proportional tax τ paid by
all households, independently of whether they send their oﬀspring to the public
school or not. The private school funds its costs by setting a tuition fee p.
Attaining the standard requires that students spend individual eﬀort. Since
eﬀort is costly, students either spend the minimum level needed to attain the
standard or pay no eﬀort at all (see Costrell, 1994). The individual cost of eﬀort
depends on innate ability. Since individuals diﬀer in innate ability, not all the
pupils in this economy attain the standard and complete secondary school.
The private school decides whether to enter in the market for education and
chooses the standard sP and the price p to maximize (expected) proﬁts. Its
proﬁt function is
π = pD − ksP (1)
where D is expected demand, which results from the aggregation of individual
enrolment choices. Once the educational standard has been set, the marginal
costs of supplying school services are assumed to be zero7.
An equilibrium
{sG,[sP(sG),p(sG)],D(sG,s P,p)}
5See Minter Hoxby, 1996, for a similar point in the context of teachers’ unions.
6We intend to show that schools can end up with diﬀerent standards even in the presence
of a common technology. Needless to say, this diﬀerentiation is further emphasized if we
introduce heterogeneous unit costs.
7Positive marginal costs complicate the algebra without providing further insights.
7is such that:
1) D(sG,s P,p) is the demand function obtained by aggregating individual
optimal choices, given sG,s P,p;
2) [sP(sG),p(sG)] is the vector of optimal responses to sG by the private
school, which takes into account the function D(sG,s P,p);
3) sG is determined by majority voting involving all households, given the
functions [sP(sG),p(sG)] and D(sG,s P,p). Alternatively, point 3) can be re-
placed by
3’) sG is determined by the government to maximize welfare, given the func-
tions [sP(sG),p(sG)] and D(sG,s P,p).
The sequential structure of the model implies that we can characterize the
equilibrium by using backward induction. We start with the last stage of the
game, the enrolment decision of households, which in turn determines the de-
mand for the services of the public and private school.
2.1 Household choice
Following De Fraja, 2002, each household in this economy consists of a mother
and a daughter. Let y be the log endowed income of the mother and w the log
earnings of the daughter. We exclude liquidity constraints by assuming that
each household can freely borrow against the future income of the daughter w.
This assumption simpliﬁes drastically the algebra and is not wholly unrealis-
tic. Carneiro and Heckman, 2002, ﬁnd that between 4 and 8 percent of children
in the US are constrained in their college investment decisions. Given that
public providers are much more important before college than at college, this
percentage is likely to be signiﬁcantly lower for decisions concerning primary
and secondary education8. We discuss verbally the consequences for our model
of introducing liquidity constraints in Section 4 of the paper.
The discount factor is equal to 1. Daughters and households are heteroge-
neous and these diﬀerences are described by the pair (θ,y), where θ is the log
8See also Cameron and Taber, 2004.
8of the reciprocal of the daughter’s ability - or minus log ability, lower for higher
ability. We assume that θ and y are jointly normally distributed, with marginal
distributions θ ∼ N(0,σ2) and y ∼ N(μy,ψ
2). Therefore, both ability A and
income Y are lognormally distributed. For future use, we deﬁne μ as the mean
of Y.
In the real world, students can drop out of school and fail to graduate9.I n
the simpliﬁed economy described in this paper, daughters either enrol in school
and attain the standard or do not enrol at all, which is equivalent to spending
zero eﬀort.
We posit that household utility U is
U = y − τ − p + w(e,s,θ,y) − θse (2)
where logY (1 − τ) ' y − τ, s = sG, sP ,eis a dummy equal to one in
the event of enrolment and school completion10 and to zero otherwise, p is the
tuition fee - zero in the public school and positive in the private school - and
θs is the eﬀort cost of attaining the educational standard s : the higher the
standard, the higher the eﬀort required to attain it, but the eﬀort cost is lower
for higher innate log ability11. When the daughter fails to enrol, her cost of
eﬀort is zero and her reservation utility is UR = y − τ − p + w(0,s,θ,y).
The assumption that household utility is concave in income and earnings
but linear in the tuition fee and in the cost of eﬀort is in line with the existing
literature in the area - see De Fraja, 200212 - and greatly simpliﬁes the alge-
bra, making the model tractable. The linearity of utility with respect to the
tuition fee implies that the enrolment decision - conditional on the educational
standards and the tuition price - depends exclusively on individual ability and
9T h ed r o p o u tr a t eo fy o u n gA m e r i c a n s-a g e d1 6t o2 4-f r o mh i g hs c h o o lw a s1 0 . 9 %i n
2000.
10Secondary school completion is a ticket for college education. While we do not directly
consider college education, we do so indirectly, because graduation from high quality primary
and secondary schools is expected to increase enrolment in a high quality college.
11Linear costs of eﬀort when s ∈ [1,2] generate corner solutions for the educational standard.
Since we are mainly interested in the relative standard of the private and public school, this
is a convenient simpliﬁcation.
12In De Fraja the household utility function is concave in the mother’s consumption and
linear in the daughter’s income.
9is independent of endowed log income y, consistently with our assumption of no
liquidity constraints.
Ak e yﬁnding of the empirical labor economics literature since Mincer - see
for instance Murnane, Willett and Levy, 1995, Bowles, Gintis and Osborne,
2001 and Hanushek and Kimko, 2000, Dearden, Meghir and Ferri, 2002 - is that
earnings are a log-linear function of individual characteristics, including school
quantity and quality. Drawing from this literature, we specify the daughter’s
earnings as
w(e,s,θ,y)=( λ0 + λ1s)e + λ2θ + λ3y + λ4X (3)
where the constant term λ0 ∈ [0,1] captures the gains associated to the at-
tained school degree, λ1 ∈ [0,1] is the labor market return to the educational
standard s - λ2 and λ3 are the returns to log individual ability and log family
income and X is a vector of residual individual characteristics. The empiri-
cal earnings function (3) suggests that the labor market recognizes both the
quantity and the quality of education - the former corresponding to the school
degree and the latter to the educational standard. Individuals who fail to enrol
in school lose λ0+λ1s in terms of expected log earnings but save the eﬀort costs
of attaining the standard s.
Conditional on enrolment, households choose either the private or the pub-
lic school, depending on the tuition fee, individual abilities and educational
standards. There are two regimes - sP >s G and sG >s P. Since household
preferences can vary with the relative ranking of educational standards, we must
consider each regime in turn.
2.1.1 Regime 1: sP >s G
The choice of the private school occurs when UPi ≥ UGi -w h e r et h es u b -
scripts P and G refer to the private and public school respectively - and UPi ≥
URi. Using (2) and (3) these conditions can be written as
θ ≤ λ1 −
p
sP − sG




10Since sP >s G, the second condition is redundant, because all the households
which prefer the private to the public school also prefer the public school to









where Φ is the standard normal distribution. More able students - with
lower θ - have lower costs of eﬀort and enrol in the private school, where the
educational standard is higher.

















where φ is the normal density. Since the normal distribution is symmetric
around the mean, φ
0
(0) = 0 and the second order term vanishes. Moreover,
Φ(0) = 1
2.
2.1.2 Regime 2: sP <s G
If sP <s G, the private school is selected if
θ ≥ λ1 +
p
sG − sP





































11Therefore, the higher the (percentage) diﬀerence in the educational standard
between the public and the private school the higher the tuition fee that the
private school can set and still attract a positive demand for its services.
Conditions (4) and (7) show that the private school has no incentive to set
the standard at the same level of the public standard, because with a positive
price it would attract no student.
2.2 The private school
Since the distribution of pupils between schools depends on whether the private
school selects a standard higher or lower than sG, we need to distinguish two
separate cases, sP >s G and sP <s G.C o n s i d e rﬁrst the case sP >s G and let
the proﬁts of the private school be πH = pDH − ksP.F o r a g i v e n sG,p r o ﬁt
maximization with respect to p yields









which implies that the demand for private school services (5) is positive for any
educational standard sP >s G. The optimal price increases in the standard sP
and decreases in the standard set by the public school. Using (11) in the ﬁrst














Since the right hand side of this expression is independent of sP,t h eo p -








. When this condition is veriﬁed, the optimal educational





2 − 2k (12)
13A detailed description of the relationship between proﬁts and the educational standard
of the public school can be found in the discussion paper version of this paper. See Brunello
and Rocco, 2005.
12Next, consider the case sP <s G and let the proﬁts of the private school be





























> 0. Therefore the optimal standard is sP =1 .T h e







2.2.1 The choice of the standard above or below sG
We now determine how the private school chooses between regime sP <s G
and regime sP >s G. Noticing that, at the optimal pricing policy, the proﬁt
functions (12) and (14) depend on the standard set by the government for public
schools, sG, we establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Assume that k 6 K. Then there exists a unique value s∗
G such
that the private school optimally chooses sP =1for any sG >s ∗
G and sP =2
for any sG <s ∗
G. In either case the school makes positive proﬁts14.
Proof. See Appendix
The proposition characterizes the private school’s best reply function and
shows that, if the private school enters in the education market, it chooses
either a higher or a lower educational standard than the public school. If it
chooses a higher standard, it sets it to the maximum feasible value. If it chooses
14In Brunello and Rocco, 2005, we relax the condition k 6 K and show that the private
school can refrain from entry for some values of sG.
13a lower standard, it sets it to the minimum feasible value15.I n s p i t e o f t h e
fact that households always pay positive tuition fees for private education, only
the former case corresponds to the hierarchical model of Epple-Romano, 1998,
where the public school is of lower quality than the private school.
The choice of the standard by the private school depends crucially on the
standard selected by the public school. Independently of the selected regime,
private tuition is a function of the diﬀerence between the public and the private
standard. Suppose that the government sets a low standard for the public
school. In this case, the private school can charge a high price by choosing
a high educational standard. As the standard in the public school increases,
however, the relative convenience that the private school has of setting a high
standard declines, and after a given threshold - s∗
G - the private school ﬁnds it
more proﬁtable to switch to a low standard. By so doing, it can increases both
tuition and proﬁts16.
The type of equilibrium which prevails depends critically on government
choice. The government chooses the educational standard of the public school
by taking into account the subsequent entry by the private school. We turn to
this decision in the next section of the paper.
3 The choice of the standard for the public school
We assume that the public sector budget, which consists only of educational ex-
penditures and income taxes, is always balanced. This is equivalent to requiring
Z
τYdF(Y )=τμ= ksG (15)






15The choice of the extreme values is dictated by the assumption that the costs of attaining
the standard in the individual utility function are linear in the standard.
16At the optimal price and private standard, the demand for private schools is a constant,
and so is the total cost of setting the standard. Therefore, proﬁts vary only with private
tuition p.
14Therefore, a higher educational standard increases the proportional tax rate
paid by all the households in this economy.
We posit that the choice of the public school standard sG i sb a s e do nm aj o r i t y
voting - as in Stiglitz, 1974, and Fernandez and Rogerson, 1995 - and describe
the outcome of the voting as follows: ﬁrst, we select the value of sG preferred by
the majority of households in each of the two regimes - the private school with
lower and higher standard than the public school. Second, we compare preferred
outcomes across regimes and choose the one favored by the majority of voters.
Last, we contrast the outcome of majority voting with the one produced by a
social planner who maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function.
3.1 Regime 1: high quality public school (sG ≥ s∗
G )
In the regime sG ≥ s∗
G the private school chooses sP =1and p =
λ0(sG−1)
2sG .












for students enrolled in the private school. Since this derivative is negative,
households with students in private schools unambiguously prefer the lowest
value of sG in the regime, s∗
G. On the other hand
∂UGi
∂sG
½> 0 if θi <λ 1 − k
μ
< 0 if θi >λ 1 − k
μ
for students enrolled in the public school. More able students, for whom the
derivative is positive, proﬁt from a higher public standard because of their rela-
tively low cost of eﬀort, and vote for sG =2 , and less able individuals, for whom
the derivative is negative, gain from a lower standard, and vote for sG = s∗
G.
The marginal student with ability θi = λ1 − k
μ is indiﬀerent to the level of
the standard, but we assume hereafter that she votes with the group having
θi <λ 1 − k
μ .We establish the following
Lemma 1 If the group of individuals with θi ≤ λ1− k
μ is the majority, it chooses
sG =2 . If the group with θi >λ 1 − k
μ is the majority, it chooses sG = s∗
G.
15Proof. See the Appendix
3.2. Regime 2: low quality public school (sG ≤ s∗
G)
In the regime sG ≤ s∗





















for individuals enrolled in the private school, and
∂UGi
∂sG
½> 0 if θi <λ 1 − k
μ → sG = s∗
G
< 0 if θi >λ 1 − k
μ → sG =1
for individuals in the public school. Again, the marginal individual is indiﬀerent
to the standard.








Proof. See the Appendix
This lemma implies that ∂UPi
∂sG is always positive if Proposition 1 holds, as
we assume. Then, sG = s∗
G, because the cost of setting up a higher standard
in the public school - relative to average income - is lower than the expected
return. We have
Lemma 3 If the group of individuals with θi ≤ λ1− k
μ is the majority, it chooses
sG = s∗
G. If the group with θi >λ 1 − k
μ is the majority, it chooses sG =1 .
Proof. See the Appendix
3.3 The choice between regimes
We use the results in the previous sub-sections to compare regimes and
establish the following
Proposition 2 If the group with θi ≤ λ1 − k
μ is the majority, it chooses the
regime sG ≥ s∗
G and sG =2 . If the majority is with the group θ>λ 1 − k
μ,i t
votes for sG ≤ s∗
G and sG =1 .
16Proof. See the Appendix
We conclude that the group with θi ≤ λ1 − k

















which is satisﬁed when the diﬀerence between the marginal beneﬁto ft h ee d u -
cational standard, λ1, and the marginal cost, k, - relative to average household
income - is higher than 0.
Notice that the majority voting condition must be consistent with the con-
dition k 6 K required for Proposition 1 to hold. When λ1 − k
μ > 0 we need to
check that k<min[μλ1,K]. Similarly, when λ1 − k
μ < 0 we must verify that
μλ1 <k6 K, otherwise the voted equilibrium where the public school oﬀers a
lower standard than the private school cannot exist.
In words, Proposition 2 tells us that, when the beneﬁt of increasing the
standard is relatively high, not only the very able but also the households with
daughters of intermediate ability can proﬁt enough from the higher standard
to compensate the cost of attaining it. Therefore the outcome of the vote is
sG =2 . If the beneﬁt declines, however, fewer voters will ﬁnd it suﬃcient to
compensate the eﬀort required by a high standard, and eventually the majority
will shift to sG =1 .
3.4 The social planner
In the "political economy" approach, households vote on the quality of edu-
cation provision - measured by the educational standard - and take into account
that a higher public quality needs to be ﬁnanced with higher income taxes. In
this sub-section we brieﬂy characterize the market for education when the gov-
ernment acts as a social planner, and contrast the results with the ﬁndings
obtained using the "political equilibrium" approach. We assume that the wel-
fare function used by the government is utilitarian and consists of the simple
17aggregation of the utilities of all the households in the economy. Moreover, we
limit our attention to the case when the private school exists in either regime.
It turns out that the social welfare function is always convex in sG
17. Therefore,
the social optimum is a corner solution in both regimes. In the next section,
we apply the model to Italy and the US and compare the outcomes of majority
voting and of social welfare maximization in these two countries.
4 An Application to Italy and the US
We apply the model to Italy and the US. The earnings function (3) postulates
that individual earnings increase both in the quantity of education and in the
level of the educational standard. Following Card, 1999, and Brunello, 2002,
the monetary return to a year of secondary education is estimated to be equal
to 11% for the US and to 8.8% for Italy.
While there is substantial evidence on the labor market eﬀects of years of
education, much less is known on the eﬀects of a higher educational standard.
In the only empirical study for the US we are aware of, Betts and Grogger,
2000, estimate the eﬀects of a higher grading standard on the earnings of young
workers using the High School and Beyond survey. According to their deﬁnition,
a school’s grading standard is a measure of how stringently it grades its students.
They ﬁnd that a one percent increase in the grading standard increases earnings
by 0.014718,as m a l le ﬀect. In order to obtain from this an estimate of λ1,w e
assume that the estimated elasticity from Betts and Grogger is equal to the
elasticity associated to the standard s, which varies between 1 and 2, and obtain
∂w
∂s = 0.0147
s , which we evaluate at average s =1 .5. We get λ1 =0 .0098.
Compared to the US, Italian high schools are organized into an academic
(licei classici and licei scientiﬁci) and a vocational track. The latter track can
be further divided into vocational schools (istituti professionali) and technical
schools (istituti tecnici), with the former having lower educational standards
17Further details are available in Brunello and Rocco, 2005.
18This elasticity is computed by multiplying the estimated coeﬃcient reported in the ﬁrst
column of their Table 4 (0.0053) by the sample mean value of the grading standard, equal to
2.78.
18than the latter. While vocational schools can last from 3 to 5 years, technical
schools and the schools in the academic track usually last 5 years.
The following evidence supports our view that the academic track in Italy
has higher educational standards than the vocational track. First, students
enrolled in the academic track exert higher eﬀort. Based on the data collected
by the Programme for International Student Assessment survey (OECD, 2004),
the average number of hours per week spent doing homework is equal to 13
i nt h ea c a d e m i ct r a c ka n dt o7i nt h ev o c a t i o n a lt r a c k . S e c o n d ,t h ef o r m e r
track attracts the best performing students from lower secondary education.
According to the Italian Survey on the School and Work Experience of 1998
High School Graduates (IHSG), close to 33 percent of the students enrolled in
the academic track completed with high marks their lower secondary education,
compared to only 13 percent in the vocational track19. Third, the average
standardized test score in maths, reading and problem solving of students aged
15 - who have just started their academic or technical track - is signiﬁcantly
higher in the former (average score: 542) than in the latter (average score:
477)20. Last but perhaps most important, when we use IHSG data and regress
individual graduation marks at the end of high school on age, gender, parental
background dummies, the marks attained in junior high school and a dummy
equal to 1 if the student has graduated from the academic track and to 0 if she
has graduated from the vocational track, we ﬁnd that the latter dummy attracts
a negative and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, pointing to a higher standard
i nt h ea c a d e m i ct r a c k 21.
We use data from the National Survey on the Income and Wealth of Italian
Households (SHIW), carried out by the Bank of Italy on a bi-annual basis,
which include information on earnings and school curriculum for a nationally
19This diﬀerence is broadly conﬁrmed by Gasperoni, 1996, who uses a diﬀerent survey of
high school students.
20Source: Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), OECD (2003)
21We estimate that - conditional on the controls listed in the text - the average graduation
m a r ki nt h ea c a d e m i ct r a c k( w h i c hi n c l u d elicei classici and licei scientiﬁci) is 4.85 percent
lower than in the vocational track (which includes istituti tecnici e professionali). Details are
availailable from the authors upon request.
19representative sample of Italians, and restrict our attention to the sub-sample of
individuals aged between 20 and 30, who have attained at most a 5-years high
school diploma. The age restriction is motivated by comparability, as Betts and
Grogger focus on entry-level wages.
We generate a discrete indicator of educational standards, equal to 1 if the
individual graduated from a vocational school, to 2 is she graduated from a
technical school and to 3 for graduation from the academic track, and specify
an empirical earnings function which is as close as possible to the one used
by Betts and Grogger for the US. After pooling the data for the period 1995
to 2004, we estimate that the elasticity of earnings to the selected measure of
educational standards is equal to 0.07222.
We also use an alternative dataset, the Italian survey on the School and Work
Experience of 1998 High School Graduates, carried out by the national statistical
oﬃce in 2001, three years after graduation. Compared to the SHIW data, these
data have the advantage of including also the high school graduates who are
attending college, as in Betts and Grogger, and the disadvantage that they do
not distinguish between 3-years and 5-years vocational schools. We restrict our
attention to individuals aged 24, close enough to the age group considered by
Betts and Grogger (25 to 27). It turns out the estimated elasticity of earnings
to the educational standard is equal to 0.055, smaller that the value obtained
from the SHIW data but still substantially higher than the elasticity found in
the US data23.
We prudentially choose the smaller estimate and assume, as for the US, that
the estimated elasticity is equal to the elasticity associated to the standard si.
This implies that for Italy λ1 =0 .0371, about four times as large as the US esti-
mates. The substantially lower return to the educational standard experienced
22The estimated coeﬃcient associated to the indicator of educational standards is 0.037
(standard error: 0.018).The elasticity reported in the text is obtained by multiplying this
coeﬃcient by 1.93, the sample average value of the standard in this dataset. The detailed
estimates are available from the authors upon request.
23The estimated coeﬃcient associated to the indicator of educational standards is 0.038
(standard error: 0.012).The elasticity reported in the text is obtained by multiplying this
coeﬃcient by 1.44, the sample average value of the standard in this dataset. The detailed
estimates are available from the authors upon request.
20by the US is in line with Bishop’s analysis of US high schools. Bishop, 1995,
points out that not only student eﬀort is poorly rewarded at school, but also is
poorly signalled to the external labor market, because of the limited use of ex-
ternal statewide achievement examinations, which are more common in Europe
and available in Italy. As a consequence, the US labor market "..fails to reward
eﬀort and achievement in high school" (p.18).
Next, we estimate the variance of the distribution of log ability. We use as
a measure of ability the scores obtained by more than 5 thousand high school
American students and more than 10 thousand Italian students in the maths,
reading, science and problem solving tests reported by the OECD 2003 PISA
Study (see OECD, 2004). After taking a simple average of these scores for each
individual, we compute the coeﬃcient of variation associated to the empirical
distribution, which is equal to 0.1847 for the US and to 0.1677 for Italy. Since
ability in our model is lognormally distributed, we impose that its coeﬃcient of











2 σ2 =0 .1689 for Italy,
which yields σ =0 .168.
We notice that the number of public schools in the real world is much higher
than 1. If M is the number of public schools, the budget constraint should
be written more realistically as Mk
μ = τ
sG, which corresponds to (16) when μ is
opportunely redeﬁned as
μ
M. The cost of setting the standard should include
the educational expenditures for teachers, labs, libraries and other facilities,
because more or better teachers and facilities are required to enforce a higher
standard. These considerations suggest that a reasonable measure of τ is the
share of public educational expenditure for primary and secondary education
on GDP. According to the OECD, 2004b, this share in 2000 was equal to 3.5
percent for the US and to 3.2 percent for Italy. We provide an appropriate scale
to these numbers by dividing them by the average standard sG =1 .5 and obtain
estimates of τ
sG equal to 0.023 for the US and to 0.021 for Italy.
Average income μ in 2000 converted in international dollars using PPP was
21equal to 34360 dollars in the US and to 20170 dollars in Italy (source: The
World Bank). The number of public schools in the US in the same year was
equal to 93273, which compares to 28133 for Italy24. Furthermore, we assume
that the variance of log income is as estimated by Baudourian, McDonald and
Turley, 2002, and equal to 0.961 for the US and to 0.67 for Italy. Finally, we
set the correlation between ability and income ρ =0 .018,u s i n gt h ee s t i m a t e s
of the relationship between test scores and parental income contained in Blau,
199925. By applying the formulas for the mean of a lognormal distribution, we
obtain μy =9 .964 for the US and μy =9 .577 for Italy.



















Moreover, we can check that k = τ
sG
μ
M is equal to 0.0086 in the US and to
0.0153 in Italy. The former veriﬁes
μ
Mλ1 <k<K ,as 0.0036 < 0.0086 < 0.0117,
while the latter veriﬁes k<min[
μ
Mλ1,K],a s0.0153 < min[0.0266,0.0154].26
Therefore, each voting majority is consistent with the condition required for
Proposition 1 to hold.
Since the returns to a higher standard are low relative to its costs, our
calibration of the US public education system suggests that the majority of
voters in this country should favor a low standard in public schools and a high
standard in private schools, consistently with the ordering of schools by quality
suggested by Epple and Romano, 1998. The opposite occurs in Italy, where the
returns to a higher standard dominate the costs. In this country, the majority
votes in favor of an equilibrium where public schools are of higher quality than
private schools.
24Sources: US data from the National Center of Educational Statistics. Italian data refer
to 2003 and are from the Italian Ministry of Education
25Given the lack of similar estimates for Italy, we assume that ρ i st h es a m ea c r o s st h et w o
countries.
26A parallel condition is a fortiori veriﬁed for Italy when λ1 =0 .0481.
22We conclude that these two countries represent two diﬀerent equilibria of our
model of educational standards. We hasten to stress, however, that the size of
these majorities is likely to be sensitive to measurement errors in the calibration
of the key parameters. Given the paucity of empirical evidence, especially for
the US, we believe that additional empirical work in the area is needed before
reaching more solid conclusions.
Based on our numerical solutions, students with lower ability in the US
either drop out or enrol in the public school. Since they have a relatively high
cost of eﬀort, and the return to the standard is relatively low, they favor a
low quality public school. The upper part of the ability distribution instead
enrols in the private school, where the educational standard is much higher.
Therefore, we reproduce the stratiﬁcation by ability emphasized by Epple and
Romano, 1998, in their stylized model of the American schooling system. Rather
than assuming, as they do, that public schools act as residual repositories, we
obtain the relatively low quality of public schools as the outcome of a voting
equilibrium, while allowing private schools to be, in principle, of lower quality
than public schools.
Is this equilibrium altered by the presence of liquidity constraints? If these
constraints are eﬀective, they must reduce enrolment in the private school in
favor of the public school. Since the utility derived from the public school is
increasing in the standard for individuals with high ability, these individuals
should vote for a high public school standard - exactly as before, given that
∂UPi
∂sG > 0 in the regime sG ≤ s∗
G. With no change in the majority, the lowest
public school standard still prevails.
In the Italian equilibrium, the students with lower ability enrol in private
schools, and favor a low standard there. Since individuals with intermediate
or higher ability enrol in public schools, there is natural pressure for a higher
standard in these schools. Again, liquidity constrained individuals who could
not enrol in private schools will end up in public schools. These individuals will
vote for a low public school standard, independently of whether they go to a
private or a public school. However, since the majority remains in favor of a
23high public school standard, the voting equilibrium is unaltered.
Finally, we compare the values of the calibrated social welfare function across
the two regimes. Consider ﬁrst the US. The local maximum is when sG =2in
the regime sG ≥ s∗
G and when sG =1in the regime sG ≤ s∗
G. By comparing
local maxima, we ﬁnd that the former is higher. Therefore, sG =1is the
educational standard which attains the global maximum. Next we look at Italy.
By comparing local maxima, we ﬁnd that sG =2is the educational standard
which yields the highest welfare. We conclude that - given the assigned values
to the parameters - the choice of the public school standard by majority voting
is consistent in both countries with welfare maximization.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
When school quality increases with the educational standard set by schools and
attaining the standard requires costly eﬀort, the market for education before
college needs not be a hierarchy with private schools oﬀering better quality
than public schools. An alternative conﬁguration, with public schools oﬀering
a higher educational standard than private schools, can also exist, in spite of
the fact that tuition levied by private schools is strictly positive. In the model
presented in this paper, private schools can oﬀer a lower educational standard
at a positive price because they attract students with a relatively high cost of
eﬀort, who would ﬁnd the high standards of the public school excessively de-
manding. Clearly, costly eﬀort is only one possible factor driving this result.
Alternatives include the fact that private schools provide access to labor market
networks, which allow to locate better jobs more easily because of the connec-
tions they aﬀord, or that they are "snob" goods, which are consumed because
of the reputation they oﬀer (see Corneo and Jeanne, 1997), even if quality is
lower than in the public school. In either case, the intuition remains the same:
by oﬀering services that are not strictly related to quality, private schools can
charge a positive price, oﬀer lower quality than public schools and still make
positive proﬁts.
24When the educational standard of the public school is chosen by majority
voting, we show that the choice between a conﬁguration with high quality pub-
lic schools and a conﬁguration with high quality private schools depends on
the marginal return to the educational standard relative to the marginal cost of
setting up the standard. We calibrate the model by using micro-econometric ev-
idence from the US and Italy and ﬁnd that, based on the calibrated parameters,
majority voting in the former country produces a system with high quality pri-
vate schools and low quality public schools, as assumed by Epple and Romano,
1998. This system is also the one chosen by a social planner who maximizes
household welfare using a utilitarian welfare function. In the latter country, an-
other majority voting equilibrium prevails, with public schools2 setting higher
educational standards that private schools. Therefore, Italy and the US can be
seen as two diﬀerent equilibria of a model of educational standards.
We believe that the model discussed in this paper has two important policy
implications. First, high school reforms that improve educational standards and
introduces curriculum based external exams, as suggested by Bishop, 1998, and
Betts, 1998, may improve the returns to educational standards in the US. If
such improvement is large enough, our model suggests that the system actually
in place could shift away from an equilibrium with low quality public schools.
Second, policies such as school vouchers requires that private schools are better
from an educational viewpoint. If these schools turn out instead to be of lower
educational quality than public schools, as in the Italian equilibrium, a key
element of the policy justiﬁcation for vouchers is likely to fall.
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296A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Let πH = πH(sP =2 ,s G) and πL = πL(sP =1 ,s G).N e x t n o t e t h a t
∂πH
∂sG < 0 and ∂πL
∂sG > 0.D e n o t e ∆ = πL − πH: clearly ∂∆
∂sG > 0. Moreover let
s∗
G be deﬁn e di ns u c haw a yt h a t∆ =0 , and suppose that s∗
G ∈ [1,2].T h e n
for sG <s ∗
G we have that ∆ < 0 and the preferred alternative is sP =2 .O n
the other hand, for all sG >s ∗
G we have ∆ > 0, a n dt h ep r e f e r r e da l t e r n a t i v ei s
sP =1 .
To guarantee entry by the private school, at least one proﬁtable option (sP =
1 or sP =2 )m u s tb ea v a i l a b l e .As u ﬃcient condition for this to happen is that
πH valued at s∗
G is nonnegative, i.e. πH(sP =2 ,s ∗
G) > 0:i fs o ,t h e nπH > 0 for
all sG <s ∗
G and πL > 0 for sG ≥ s∗
G. More explicitly, replace s∗
G in πH to get






























(k+A−2B)2+4AB < 0 as
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
k+A−2B √
(k+A−2B)2+4AB
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ < 1.











G ∈ [1,2] whenever k 6 K, for any A and B.S i n c eπH(sP =2 ,s ∗
G) >
0 as k<K , the private school enters the market and sets sP =1if sG >s ∗
G
and sP =2if sG <s ∗
G.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
Since the reciprocal of individual log ability θ is distributed in the interval
[−∞,∞],we need to examine in some detail how households vote in regime
sG >s ∗
G.
30• individuals with θi ∈ [−∞,λ 1 +
p
sG−sP = λ1 + λ0
2sG] choose to enrol in
the public school. Therefore, those with θi <λ 1 − k
μ vote for sG =2 ,
and those with λ1 − k
μ <θ i <λ 1 + λ0
2sG vote for sG = s∗
G.T h em a r g i n a l
individual with θi = λ1 − k
μ is indiﬀerent.
• Individuals with θi ∈ [λ1+ λ0
2sG,λ 1+ λ0
sG] prefer the private school and vote
for sG = s∗
G.
• Individuals with θ ∈ [λ1 + λ0
sG,∞] do not participate. Since their utility
UR is decreasing in sG, they vote for sG = s∗
G.












φ(0) where B is deﬁn e da si nt h ep r o o f






≤ 0, but we
can prove a weaker condition. Replace
√
A2 + B2 in the deﬁnition of K with
A + B −
√
2AB, a quantity strictly lower than
√



























σμ ∼ 7σμ (22)
The last inequality if veriﬁed for all λ0 ∈ [0,1] given reasonable values of σ
and μ (see the application in Section 5).
P r o o fo fL e m m a3
In regime sG <s ∗
G, voting occurs as follows:






] choose the private school
and vote sG = s∗









regime  sG>sG* 
regime  sG<sG* 
Private Public  Public  No schooling 
Public Public Public  Private  No schooling 
λ1- 
(σ/4φ+ λ1/2) 
λ1+λ0/sG  λ1-k/μ 
λ1+λ0/2sG  λ1+λ0(sG+1)/2sG λ1-k/μ 
Public
If the majority, the majority 
voting outcomes are  
sG=2       for sG>sG* 
sG=sG*    for sG<sG* 
If the majority, the majority 
voting outcomes are  
sG=sG*       for sG>sG* 
sG=1           for sG<sG* 
θ 
θ 
Figure 1: School choice and voting







sG] choose the public school.
Those with θi <λ 1− k
μ vote sG = s∗
G,a n dt h o s ew i t hθi >λ 1− k
μ vote















,λ 1 + λ0
sG]
• Finally, individuals with θi ∈ [λ1 + λ0
sG,∞] do non participate to upper
secondary school and vote for the minimum value of sG, i.e. sG =1 .
Therefore, all individuals with θi <λ 1− k
μ vote for sG = s∗
G while all the
others vote for sG =1
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Let the group of students with θi ≤ λ1 − k
μ in Figure 1 be the majority.
Then, the voting outcome is sG =2if sG ≥ s∗
G and sG = s∗
G if sG ≤ s∗
G.W h e n
32sG ≥ s∗
G, the students belonging to the group go to the public school; when
sG ≤ s∗













<θ i <λ 1 − k
μ. Consider the group going
to the public school in either regime and compare their utilities. The regime
sG ≥ s∗
G is preferred because
UG(sG =2 )− UG(sG = s∗








Next take the group going to the public school in regime sG ≥ s∗
G and to
the private school in the other regime. The former regime is preferred because
















Therefore, when the group with θi ≤ λ1 − k
μ is the majority, the regime
sG ≥ s∗
G and the public school standard sG =2are selected.
Turning to the voting behavior of the group with θi >λ 1 − k
μ, suppose it is
the majority. Then the voting outcome is sG = s∗
G in the regime sG ≥ s∗
G and
sG =1in the regime sG ≤ s∗
G. Under the former regime (sG ≥ s∗
G), students
go to the public school if λ1 − k
μ <θ i <λ 1 + λ0
2s∗
G and to the private school if
λ1 + λ0
2s∗









enrol in either school. Under the latter regime (sG ≤ s∗
G), students endowed
with λ1− k
μ <θ i <λ 1+λ0 go to the public school and students with θi >λ 1+λ0
do not enrol in any secondary school. Notice that the deﬁnition of thresholds
already incorporates the majority voting outcome in the regime.
Consider ﬁrst the students going to the public school in both regimes, i.e.
those with λ1− k
μ <θ i <λ 1+ λ0
2s∗
G.T h er e g i m esG ≤ s∗
G (and the choice sG =1 )
is preferred because
UG(sG = s∗




+ λ1 − θi) < 0
Take now those with λ1 + λ0
2s∗





G w h og ot ot h ep r i v a t e
school in the ﬁrst regime and to the public the second. By comparing their
payoﬀs, we obtain
UP(sG = s∗








33which implies that their preferred choice is sG =1 .




G <θ<λ 1 + λ0. While in the ﬁrst
regime they do not enrol in any school, in the second regime they choose the
public school. Comparing voting outcomes we obtain
UN(sG = s∗




G − 1) − (λ0 + λ1 − θ) < 0
and the preferred outcome is sG =1 .
Finally, students endowed with θ>λ 1+λ0 do not enrol in secondary school
and only care about reducing their tax burden, which is attained by voting on
t h el o w e s ta v a i l a b l es t a n d a r d sG =1 .Therefore, when the group with θi >λ 1− k
μ
is the majority, its preferred alternative is unanimously sG =1 .
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